




MAKING SENSE OF FAILED COUP 








Coup d’etat was not a new phenomenon for Turkey because several successful 
coups previously had happened led by military to protect the Kemalism in Turkey. 
However, what happened in the night of 16 July 2016 was very historical for 
Turkey, because the coup d’etat attempt was successfully defeated. This time, 
nevertheless, although done by a military junta, Erdoğan believes that the master 
mind of the coup was his former ally, Fethullah Gülen, leader of cultural Islamic 
based organization (Gülen Movement). This claim was very interesting, despite the 
fact that both parties are known for their deeply Islamic roots and former allies. 
Therefore, this paper tends to make sense of what actually had happened between 
both parties, hence Gülen Movement was alleged as the coup plotters. Why the 
coup attempt failed and what is the aftermath of the coup?.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The night of July 15th 2016 was a historical night for the modern Turkey. The 
night marked the first failed coup conducted by a faction of military junta in 
modern Turkey. During the coup, two important cities in Turkey namely Istanbul 
and Ankara were claimed to be taken by coup plotters hence Erdogan was no 
longer the president of Turkish Republic. However, this circumstance was soon 
altered after hundreds of Turkish citizen went down to streets as instructed by 
Erdoğan to prevent the coup attempt by attacking the coup soldiers. Despites many 
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casualties occurred from both military faction and also citizen, it was soon clear 
that the coup attempt had failed as the morning came.  
Soon after the failed coup, interestingly however, President Erdoğan announced 
the name of the person who plotted the coup. He claimed that Fethüllah Gülen, a 
famous Muslim cleric based on Pennsylvania, United State, was the mastermind of 
failed coup attempt and expected the US to extradite him from his self-imposed 
exile to Turkey to be put on trial. As a response to the accusation, Fethullah Gülen 
rejected that accusation and even accused Erdoğan to have staged the coup.  
This incident is very intriguing to be analyzed for both of the conflicting parties 
used to be allies particularly since AK Party came to power in 2002. Also, both 
Erdoğan and Gülen are rooted with a deep Islamic tradition. This paper tries to 
dissect the causes of the conflict until the coup attempt, why the coup had failed 
and what are the aftermath of the coup for Turkey.  
A BRIEF HISTORY OF COUP IN TURKEY 
Despite the coup was the first failed coup happened in the history of modern 
Turkey, that was not the first coup attempt. Since the foundation of modern 
Turkey in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Attaturk, Turkey has suffered a number of coup 
attempts conducted by Military. As instructed by the Turkish constitution, military 
were blessed with an authority to intervene the ruling government to protect the 
ideology of Turkish nation, Kemalism. Therefore, as the guardian of a nation, they 
will directly take control of Turkish nation whenever they considered that Turkey 
or its ideology was threatened.  
The examples were obvious from the history. Despite Turkish people were 
considerably better under Democratic party (1950 – 1960), the agricultural income 
increased very significantly which larger farmers benefited the most, and 
industrialist were also relatively much improving (Zürcher J. 2004, 226), in the 
early morning of May 27th 1960, however, Adnan Menderes—Turkey Prime 
Minister from Democratic Party—was the first victim of military coup. The coup 
might have happened due to Adnan Menderes seemed to loosen government 
restriction over religion as opposed to previous era during Mustafa Kemal and 
İnönü. He reopened thousands of mosques, lifted up the illegalization of Arabic 
adhan, opened many schools for religious personnel and shortened the period of 
mandatory military service. As the consequence, military stepped in and toppled 
Menderes’s government. Not only some his comrades were arrested, Menderes was 
hanged. His position was replaced by military general Cemal Gürsel who ruled 
both as president and prime minister until 1965(Al Jazeera, n. d. ). The military 
returned the presidential seat to the politicians in 1961 after making some 
important reforms. One of the important reforms was the establishment of Milli 
Güvenlik Kurulu (National Security Council), a body dominated by military to 
ensure the domestic and foreign policy were aligned with basic creed of the 
Kemalist Revolution (Ulus 2011, 16).  
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Second coup happened as military response toward restless “anarchy” condition in 
Turkey. Since the late of 1960s, Turkish economy stagnated hence many recessions 
happened. The current conditions led to many demonstration and violent among 
Turkish groups. The government failed to halt the violence on campuses and 
streets. Again, as the Turkey’s guardian, military delivered an ultimatum. They 
demanded Suleyman Demirel—Prime Minister at the time—should restore strong 
and credible government, otherwise military would take over his government. 
Eventually soon after that on 12 March 1971, Demirel resigned (Zürcher J. 2004, 
258) and was replaced by non-military officer, Nihat Erim, a member of Republic 
Party.  
Since the last coup, Turkish economy did not show any improvement although 
Prime Minister had been replaced 11 times during 1970s. Consequently, the 
military started to consider replacing the ruling government again. In September 
1980, another Turkish government was toppled and replaced by a naval military 
officer, Bulent Ulusu. The fourth coup happened in 1997, this time it was called as 
postmodern coup. This coup was triggered by the popularity of an Islamist political 
party, Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), led by Necmettin Erbakan. Erbakan and his 
party used Milli Görüş idea, a religious vision which focused on moral and spiritual 
strength of Islam. Due to his religious tendencies and also some terrorist issues, 
military faction gave him a series of ultimatum. Erbakan was out of choice but to 
accept it and then he resign and in 1998, his Refah Party was shut down. (Al 
Jazeera, 2016. ) 
THE RISE OF POLITICAL Islam AND CULTURAL Islam IN TURKEY 
Mustafa Kemal’s and his successor’s, Ismet Inönü, top-down radical transformation 
had caused new division of society in Turkey. Due to most of the transformations 
were done in urban centers and hardly in countryside area, the Turkish people 
living in urban center became more modern and secular while suburban people still 
lived in their religious and traditional life. Although the dominant new elite was 
urban, modern, secular, and actively involved in politics, the larger part of the 
Turkish population, suburban people, was isolated from politics, still loyal to their 
traditional habits and lifestyle and Islam remained their strongest inspiration for 
life. This condition stayed as it was until after 1970s when Turkish military agreed 
to start the idea of “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” and Turgut Özal started his political 
and and economic reforms in the mid-1980s. The military idea and Özal reforms 
had strengthen the role of Islamic groups. Turkish-Islamic synthesis was 
promulgated to prevent communism and leftist ideology spread within Turkish 
community. Therefore, religious education such as Quranic class, state-controlled 
moral education became compulsory subjects in all schools. Besides, Özal liberal 
economy resulted a large-scale arrival of suburban population into the cities. Also, 
his decision to give more religious freedom allowed the Islamist to organize 
politically (Rabasa and Larabbee 2008, 31–39). Those progressions supported 
Islamist party, such as Welfare Party (Refah Party), to rise and even became one of 
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the largest parties in 1996 under Necmettin Erbakan. Unfortunately, the Islamist 
political reign did not last long for the military intervention in 1997.  
Learning from the its predecessor, Refah Party, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AK 
Party) under the leadership of Erdoğan has adapted and chosen a different political 
ideology. Erdoğan claimed that AK party is a conservative democratic party2 and 
has abandoned Milli Görüş concept, therefore the focus of AK party is economic 
stability and EU Membership. The visions became the keys for the electoral success 
of AK Party in 2002. With the large-scale arrival of suburban population in the 
Varoş—poorer and less-developed part of the cities—AK party’s visions and its 
Islamic roots has won the heart of the Varoş people, who are pios, socially 
conservative, and uninterested in secular parties (Rabasa and Larabbee 2008, 49). 
From 2002 then 2007, 2011, and 2015 AK Party kept gaining significant ballots 
consecutively as 34%, 46,6%, 49. 83% and 49. 5% in Turkey general election.  
In addition to the emergence of political Islam in Turkey, another Islamic 
movement has also emerged since the 1966s. The political policy supporting more 
religious freedom since in the early 1950 and followed by liberal economy policy 
applied particularly during Turgut Özal period opened many opportunity space to 
Islamist group to emerge. One of the famous groups is Gülen Movement (GM) 
founded by Fethullah Gülen. As a former employee of the State’s Directorate of 
Religious Affair, Gülen is a success leader who organizes transnational, wealthy, 
and faith-based Islamic movement in Turkey. His movement owns mass medias 
such as Zaman Newspaper and Samanyolu Tv, education centers such as Fatih 
University, and also many local and international businessmen.  
He started the movement in Kestanepazarı Quran school by providing both secular 
and religious education in Summer camp. Along with the time, his charismatic 
figure, inspiring and emotional speech and deep knowledge of Islam has attracted 
many young men to sacrifice themselves to rejuvenate the Turkish’s spiritual and 
intellectual capital which will help the Islamization of public space and debates. In 
addition, GM is not a static organization, it is very dynamic. The evolution of GM 
as recorded by Hakan Yavuz is divided into three phase, namely the formative 
period (1966 – 1983), the emergence into the public sphere (1983 – 1997) and the 
paradox of persecution and forced liberalization (1997 – present). Each of the 
phases formed by structural changes that reproduce a more contextual framing 
process (Yavuz 2003, 179).  
Furthermore, although his claim to be apolitical Islamic movement, Gulen 
Movement, in Hakan Yavuz’s words: “…The movement used all political means to 
get access to educational institution, media, the market, and other urban public spaces 
by establishing its own institution or through its followers. Informal ties were critical in 
the evolution and activities of the community-building movement”(Yavuz 2003, 182). 
This approach has been the model for many future policies applied by Gülen 
2 Despite the claim that AK party has abandon Islamist agenda and reconcile with the 
framework of Turkish secularization, many still refer AK party as Islamist party. However, I believe 
it is safe to say that AK party is a political party with strong Islamic roots.  
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Movement. For instance, after the coup attempt in 1980, Gülen’s Movement and 
also his preaching was banned and even himself was put in jail for seven months. 
However, Turgut Özal, Prime minister then, helped the ban lifted because Özal 
wanted to profit from the Gülen Islamic liberal ideas and activities against 
extremist Islamist group (Yavuz 2003, 183). Moreover, despite his personal passive 
involvement with politics, he encourages his followers to insert themselves in many 
important positions in Turkish Government such as in Police Department, Judicial 
and also other bureaucratic offices.  
ERDOĞAN VS GÜLEN 
Despite his strong affiliation with previous Islamist Refah Party, Erdoğan is 
different with Erbakan. Therefore, AK party redefines itself by neglecting Milli 
Göruş idea and represents, as Tanju Tosun explained, a catch-all party and should 
not be regarded as religious party (Rabasa and Larabbee 2008, 49). They managed 
themselves as a dynamic party who seeks to integrate center-right voters by 
stressing its socially conservative Muslim-Turkish and economically liberal project 
(Yavuz 2003, 250).  
Therefore, AK party’s vision about economy stability and also joining European 
Union attracted the attention of Gülen, who also differed himself from other 
Islamic groups including Milli Görüş Group, and shared similarity with more 
secular segment of Turkish society (Yavuz 2003, 201). This was the starting point 
of Gülen Movement and Erdoğan unofficial allies. In addition, Gülen’s bad 
experience with military faction and Military scrutiny toward AK Party made the 
two group shared the same enemy. This then led to symbiotic cooperation between 
GM and AK Party. On one hand, GM community base will provide strong social 
capital for AK Party, on the other hand, GM can reach to various position in 
Government through the support of AK Party.  
One of the obvious cooperation was on the case of Ergenekon and Sledgehammer. 
According to Turkish Prosecutor explained that Ergenekon and Sledgehammer 
operation was a conspiracy established in 2003 in order to trigger a coup against 
Erdoğan. This case targeted the former and active high-level military officer along 
with other anti-AKP institution such as media and NGOs who were accused of 
plotting coup the ruling government. As the action was the capturing of more than 
300 people including Military officers such as Cetin Dogan, Özden Örnek, 
İbrahim Fırtına, which later will be put on trial. GM’s follower who sits in 
judiciary helped to do the trial in 2013 and decided to sentence 20 year of jail for 
the mentioned army commander. (Aljazeera 2013) 
However, such cooperation did not last for long. Both groups started to throw 
critics to each other on various occasion particularly since the third period of AK 
Party ruled Turkey (2011 – 2015). There is no clear evidence stating why and 
when exactly the crack was started. It is possible that the break was motivated by 
growing power possessed by Erdoğan. This condition worried GM that AK Party 
will not need any allies because they are already very strong. As Yavuz Cabanoğlu, a 
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Tunceli University scholar, says “The AKP-Community (GM) relationship used to be 
always reciprocal. The government made use of the Community’s social base and media 
clout, while the Community easily achieved its interests — public office positions, public 
tenders and so on. Once the AKP asserted its political hegemony — and it is only 
natural for a democratically elected party to control the state apparatus — the 
Community became redundant,”(Kutahyalı 2013). Another possible reason could be 
due to different approach on various domestic and foreign policy used by both 
group and taking this reason as consideration then the Gülen and Erdoğan clash 
can be explained chronologically through four major events.  
First, according to a source close to Gülen, the crack was started in May 2010 
related to Mavi Marmara cases. Gülen did not approve the political methods used 
by Erdoğan related to sending a flotilla to Gaza without asking the permission of 
Israel Government at the first place. During the expedition, Israel soldier attacked 
the flotilla resulting to some civilian casualties. Gülen responded that the 
organizers' failure to seek accord with Israel before attempting to deliver aid is a 
sign of defying authority, and will not lead to fruitful matters. ” This blunt 
criticism was never “forgiven” by Erdoğan.  
Second was on the method used to approach Kurdish Issues. In February 2012, a 
pro-Gülen prosecutor called Hakan Fidan, head of National Intelligence Agency 
(MIT), to be interrogated as suspects for the his direct contact (illegal contact) with 
the head of PKK (Kurdish Rebellion). Despite Erdoğan’s clarification that the 
approach was a direct order from him, the case kept continue. Gülen’s comments 
on the even was that Erdogan should have focused on broader political reform, 
push for a civilian constitution and grant all the rights the Kurd of Turkey 
demand, including recognition of ethnic identity, education in their mother 
tongue, and endorsement of local government without talking directly to the PKK 
(Baydar 2013). Since then, the clash between Erdoğan and Gülen has worsen and 
the Erdoğan supporters started to call GM as “parallel state” within the state. The 
parallel states was accused to act on its own through empowering its internal 
hierarchy and employed state power for its own purposes. (Akyol 2014) 
As the backlash for the previous event, in the mid-November 2012, Erdoğan 
planned to close prep-school which prepare Turkish students to face various exams 
in the Turkish educational system. Prep-school was used by the GM as quarter of 
its finance and human resource, hence the closing of the prep-school could 
devastate GM institution. (Uras 2013) 
The last event signing the divorce phase of the two group was the corruption 
accusation in 17 December 2013. Istanbul Police found shoeboxes stashed with $4. 
5 million in cash at the home of a state-owned bank's chief executive. This case led, 
so called, “to be the most extensive and sensational investigation leading to dozens 
of detention – from renowned business people to senior bureaucrats and sons of 
minister”. Within eight days, Erdogan Bayraktar and his three other comrades were 
accused to be involved in the corruption hence they resigned. However, a shocking 
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statement was when Bayraktar said Erdogan should resign too (Kutahyalı 2013). 
The investigation definitely threatens to rock Erdogan's 11-year tenure.  
Since then the two opposing group threw accusation to each other. The Pro-AKP 
alleged GM as the making “parallel state” by trying to take down AKP government 
by means of the corruption probe, while pro-GM accused the government trying to 
hide its pervasive corruption by making up a conspiracy theories and hindering the 
judiciary to investigate the government (Akyol 2014). Those are the four major 
event signing the crack and the divorce of the symbiotic cooperation between AK 
Party and Gülen Movement. The increasing tension between both parties 
continued and reach its culmination point on July 14th, 2016, a day before the 
coup attempt happened.  
WHY THE COUP FAILED? 
Interestingly, the coup failed owing to the bravery of thousands Turkish citizens 
who went down the streets to prevent the success of the coup attempt. Around 10 
p. m Turkish time, 15th July 2016, a number of military faction was already 
stationed in two important cities in Turkey; Istanbul and Ankara. In both 
municipalities, soldiers and tanks already occupied strategic places in Ankara and 
Istanbul such as two bridges in Istanbul connecting Asia and Europe. Then around 
11 p. m., Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım announced that a military faction attempt 
to overthrown the ruling government. Then later Turkish President, Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan also broadcasted on live TV that the Fethullah Terror Organization 
(FETO) was behind the coup attempt, hence he ordered his people to went down 
to the streets to save democracy. At around 3 a. m TRT State TV announced that 
the coup was failed. The incident took 265 death toll and 1. 440 wounded. 
(Gurcan 2016) 
One of the factor that move the citizen of Turkey to take down the streets was the 
economic factor. This also has been one of the major factor of AK Party general 
election’s success story back in 2002. In 2002, Turkish economy was very bad that 
it shrank up until 9,5 percent in 2001; the currency was undervalued several times, 
and the banking sector devastated (Rabasa and Larabbee 2008, 48). After the 
winning in 2002, AK Party has proven its effectiveness by improving its economy 
stability since the first winning in 2002 and even soared at quarter of 2016 a rate of 
4. 8 percent defeating Great Britain and Sweden(Anadolu Agency 2016). Fulfilled 
with the satisfaction, indeed, the citizen has trusted the AK party more than ever.  
Another factors were mainly divided into four factors. First, the military faction 
failed to detain the head of Turkish Republic, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Owing to 
General Umit Dundar, his early warning to President Erdoğan about the coup 
attempt hence it was necessary for Erdoğan to leave Marmara before the coup 
forces raided his hotel. Second, the strongest military faction namely the land 
forces did not support the coup. The coup forces were only constituted of Air 
Forces personnel (8% of Türkiye Silahlı Kuvvetleri) and gendarmerie (15% of 
TSK), while the land forces constitutes 65% of the TSK. Third, most of the coup 
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soldiers were sent out into streets in order to “exercise or terror activity. Fourth, the 
coup forces failed to take down mainstream TV channel, which then gave the 
government psychological advantages (Gurcan 2016).  
In the morning after the coup attempt, Erdogan directly accused Fethullah Gülen 
was the mastermind of the coup and demanded the US government to extradite 
the Muslim clerics to be put on trial in Turkey. However, despite the claim made 
by government and some evidences showing the involvement of Gülen’s followers, 
yet there is no direct evidence showing the coup related to Gülen himself. Mustafa 
Akyol, Hurriyet Journalist, also assumes that the coup only related to Gülen’s loyal 
followers, but also do not mention the direct relation to Fethullah Gülen. Gülen 
himself, in a few interviews, has rejected the government’s accusation toward him. 
Now, Turkish Government has detained nearly 60 thousands people, including 
military, academics, teachers, and students and close more than 1000 private 
schools and institutions.  
CONCLUSION 
The claim made by Erdoğan right after the coup attempt that the Fethullah Gülen 
was the mastermind of coup attempt then already make sense. The growing 
tensions between both parties since 2010 has separated both former allies who used 
to work together to defeat their common enemy. The tension between both parties 
could be caused by the significant growing power of AK Party and also different 
approaches on domestic and foreign policy. After the coup, the investigation upon 
the detainee keeps continue despite the critics from European Union about the 
method used by the Government to gain information from the prisoner.  
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